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STATUTES:
ldaho Code Section 12-121
RULES:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of Case

This appeal arises from a divorce action filed by Susan Montoya, henceforth called
"Susan" in this document, against Marvin Montoya, henceforth called "Marvin" in this
document. Prior to trial, the parties were able to settle all issues regarding the entry of the
divorce, the proper allocation of property and debts, and custody of, and visitation with,
their two children. The only issues tried to the magistrate were (1) the amount of Marvin's
income for child support purposes, (2) whether Marvin should pay a portion of Susan's
attorney fees related to child custody and support, and (3) whether Marvin should pay all
of the fees of the court-appointed expert, Tim Collias, who assisted the parties in reaching
..their agreement regarding custody and visitation.=lngeneralterms, this appeal arises from
the first two of those issues.
II. Course of Proceedings Below

Susan filed her complaint for divorce on February 7, 2006. R, pp. 12-16. In the
complaint, she sought primary physical custody of the parties' two children and child
support calculated in accordance with the Idaho Child Support Guidelines. R, pp. 13-14.
Marvin answered the complaint on February 21, 2006, also seeking primary physical
custody and child support. R, pp. 17-23. Many motions were filed in the course of the
pretrial proceedings. R, pp. 3-1 1.
The case went to trial on September 12, 2006. At the conclusion of the trial, the
parties waived oral argument in favor of written closing presentations to be completed by
October 31, 2006. Tr., p. 190, L. 4 through p. 191, L. 18. After listening to the evidence
and considering the written arguments of the parties, the magistrate entered, on December
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7, 2006, his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in which he fixed Marvin's
annual gross income pursuant to the ldaho Child Support Guidelines at $140,339, ordered
Marvin to pay monthly child support of $1,311.50, held that Susan had sufficient resources
to pay her own attorney fees, and decided that Susan's claim that Marvin should pay the
fees of the court appointed expert was premature. See R., pp. 36-51. The Final Judgment
and Decree of Divorce was entered pursuant to the Magistrate's opinion on January 10,
2007. See R., pp. 52-62. As matters turned out, Susan did not pursue the issue of the
expert's fees after the entry of the judgment and decree of divorce.
On February 8, 2007, Susan appealed the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce
asserting that the magistrate erred by "ignoring and/or misconstruing" evidence presented
at trial in determining the p-arties' respective income for purposes of child-support and by
"failing to carefully review" Marvin's income and expenses from the operation of his
business. R., pp. 63-66. She also argued that she was entitled to attorney fees on both
the trial and appellate levels. R., p. 71. Marvin made a claim for attorney fees on appeal
under ldaho Code Section 12-121, asserting that Susan's appeal amounted only to a
request that the appellate court second-guess the findings of the magistrate.
On December 6, 2007, the District Court, Senior Judge D. Duff McKee presiding,
entered a Memorandum Decision in which he vacated the magistrate's findings of fact on
account of his perception that the magistrate had failed to make a complete analysis of the
evidence pertaining to Marvin's income and to make appropriate findings. R., pp. 67-71.
This appeal followed.
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Ill. Statement of Facts
Because the primary issue in this appeal is whetherthe magistrate made a complete
and accurate analysis of the evidence, it is necessary to discuss the evidence before him
in some detail. Hence, the approach of this statement of facts.
In the pretrial proceedings, Susan testified by affidavit filed on March 24,2006, that
Marvin was 59 years old and "was too old to raise and parent children", that he was "not
an involved parent", and that it was "not in the children's best interest for [Marvin] to have
overnight visitation because the children are not verywell bonded with him, do not do well
during his more lengthy care periods, because he cannot really parent alone (requiring his
older sons to help him) and because he doesn't understand the children's needs." See
Exhibit I, as identified in the Order Granting Motion to Augment Clerk's Re~ord~henceforth
called "the Order". She also testified by affidavit filed on May 18, 2006, that Marvin was
applying "extortion-like pressure" in the course of settlement negotiations, that it would be
"traumatic" for the children to be away from her overnight, and that it would be "very
unhealthy and traumatic" for the children to take a vacation with Marvin to visit his parents
in New Mexico unless she were to go along with them on the trip. She further testified by
affidavit filed on May 19,2006, that Marvin "was rarely involved in [the children's] care" and
that he had filed a motion to retake possession of a house that was his separate property
for "no purpose" and that it was "not in [her] children's best interest to have litigation . . .
by Marvin seeking overnight visitation or visitation outside the State of Idaho with his
parents." Emphasis added. In that same affidavit, she claimed that "much of the litigation
[was] caused by Marvin's anger because [she] was divorcing him", that Marvin was not
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"making very good decisions and is driven by his own rejection and selfish behavior", and
-

that Marvin was simply out "to punish [her]". See Exhibit 3, as identified in the Order.
Susan opened her case at trial on September 12,2006, by introducing into evidence
various exhibits that showed Marvin's income between 2003 and 2005 to have ranged from

$273,871 to $376,427. Tr., p. 25, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 22. See, Exhibits 2, 29,48 and 49. She
then testified to Marvin's previous estimate that his income for 2006 would be only

$120,000. Tr., p. 27, L. 25 - p. 28, L. 8. She continued by asserting that Marvin and
Fernando Veloz, the comptroller of MS Administrative Services, Inc., a company owned
by Marvin, had explained in deposition testimony that Marvin was no longer taking
commissions as income because he was using them to pay rent to one of his companies.
Tr., p 28, LL. 9-24. See Tr., p. I1 0, L. 25 - p 111, L. 25. The rent at issue, she explained,
was being paid for space in a building owned by Marvin. Tr., p. 29, LL. 2-9. She then
testified to a financial statement, Exhibit 52A, that showed Marvin's income in 2005 to be
around $398,000. Tr., p. 29, L. 10 - p. 30, L. 6.
Susan continued by explaining that Marvin had told her that he received income
from two companies: MS Administrative Services, which received income through
administrative fees for processing insurance claims, and MST Insurance Agency, which
received commission income from the sale of various insurance policies.

MS

Administrative Services paid Marvin a salary and MST paid Marvin commissions. See Tr.,
p. 30, L. 12 - p. 31, L. 19. By reference to Exhibit 19, the parties' tax returns for 2005,
Susan identified commission income to Marvin of $165,296 during that year and asserted
that, to her knowledge, Marvin still received that income. See Tr., p. 31, L. 13 - p. 32, L.
4. By reference to Exhibit 4, Susan identified Marvin's salary from MS Administrative
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Services to be $109,000. See Tr., p. 32, LL. 8-12. To the commissions and salary, Susan
added gasoline reimbursement and vehicle lease payments of $5,100 and $9,552,
respectively, to obtain total income to Marvin of $289,028. Tr., p. 32, L. 16 - p. 33, L. 12.
See Exhibit 4. This was characterized by Susan as Marvin's income based on his 2005
tax return. See Tr., p. 33, LL. 14-18. Susan testified that her income was $93,000 per
year. SeeTr.,p.32,L.25-~.33,L.18.
Susan then testified to Exhibit 65, which qhowed Marvin's income for 2005 to have
been $294,558 and projected his income for 2006 at $126,415, including commissions
already received in 2006 from Blue Cross, United Heritage and Delta Dental of $17,335.
Tr., p. 35, LL. 1-11. See Exhibit 65. She attributed the difference to the exclusion of
Marvin's commission income from the calculations. Tr., p. 35, LL. 12-14; She thought that
the commission income should still be included in the determination of Marvin's income.
Tr., p. 35, LL. 15-17.
Turning to the issue of attorney fees, Susan explained that she received $66,000
from Marvin by way of a real property settlement and that she spent all of that money in
buying a new home. See Tr., p. 36, L. 21 - p. 37, L. 13. She testified to two retirement
accounts that she owned that totaled $93,552, Tr., p. 37, L. 14 - p. 38, L. 17, but which
were not readily available to her because of withdrawal penalties. Tr., p. 38, L. 23 - p. 39,
L. 4. She then testified to $9,000 of assets in horses and a trailer and to other assets of
household goods and a vehicle in which she claimed to have no equity. Tr., p. 39, LL. 516. Marvin, she said, had a net worth of $3,854,000. Tr., p. 39, LL. 17-21.
Susan claimed not to be able to pay her attorney fees and testified that she would
have to sell off assets to do so. Tr., p. 39, L. 22 - p. 40, L. 4. She therefore asked for an
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award of attorney fees to cover the custody and child support portion of the case. Tr., p.
-

40, LL. 5-8. The total fee that she had incurred was $19,178 as of August 31, 2006,
including the fees owed to Collias, but not including her attorney's work through September

12, 2006. Tr., p. 40, L. 9 - p. 41, L. 3. See Exhibit 10.
Susan claimed that Marvin had greater resources, assets and debts and that she
could not pay her regular monthly bills on her income of $93,000 per year. Tr., p. 41, L.

20 - p. 41, L. f 0. Not even an increase in child support of up to $2,600 per month would
enable her to catch up her attorney fees, she claimed, because she had debts associated
with the purchases of appliances and landscaping associated with getting into her new
home and costs associated with raising the parties' children. Tr., p. 42, L. 11 - p. 43, L. 1.
Marvin, Susan claimed, had caused herto incur unnecessaryfees by making false
accusations such as using drugs, by asking for time to take a vacation in New Mexico with
his parents and by asking for a mental examination by Dr. Craig Beaver. Tr., p. 43, LL. 2-

21. In affidavits, she said, he had compared her to Andrea Yates, a mother who killed her
children, and to Susan Smith. See Tr., p. 43, L. 22 - p. 44, L. I . He further increased her
attorney fees, she asserted, by claiming that his income had fallen in the course of the
case. Tr., p. 44, LL. 6-15. At the end of her direct examination, she testified that Mawin
had testified in his deposition on August 23, 2005, that she was a good mother. Tr., p. 44,
LL. 16-23.

On cross-examination, Susan admitted that Marvin's testimony describing her as
a good mother was given after Tim Collias had completed his parenting evaluation and
after the results of the mental evaluation had been disclosed and agreed that this was a
step in the right direction toward effective co-parenting. Tr., p. 45, LL. 8-22. She refused,
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however, to admit that Marvin's testimony was made in good faith. Tr., p. 45, LL. 19-22.
She conceded that she had stipulated to pay one-half of the fees charged by Tim Collias
and to the mental examination by Dr. Beaver. See Tr., p. 45, L. 23 - p. 46, L. 3.
Susan then admitted to a base salary of $86,500, a bonus of $8,000, and to another
$5,000 of benefits that were not reportable as income on a W-2. Tr., p. 46, LL. 4-21. She
claimed that, with this income, she was unable to meet her reasonable needs, but admitted
that she was not economically disadvantaged. Tr., p. 46, L. 22 - p. 47, L. 2. She further
admitted that the disparity in assets visa vis Marvin was due to a premarital agreement
that she had executed before he married her. Tr., p. 47, LL. 3-12.
Susan explained that the landscaping costs to which she had previously testified
amounted to $3,00O,.that the money spent on new appliances amounted to $6,000, and
that the furniture expense was $8,000. Tr., p. 47, LL. 12-19. She denied that she had
done anything to present Marvin in an unfavorable light in the course of the action and
claimed to havetold the truth about everything throughout the course of the entire litigation.
Tr., p. 48, LL. 2-7.
Her knowledge of the structure of Marvin's business was certain, Susan said,
because of constant conversations about that subject in 2005. Tr., p. 48, LL. 11-20.
These discussions had focused upon the possibility of her taking control of Mawin's
company, thus becoming an integral part of the operation. Tr., p. 48, L. 21 - p. 49, L. 7.
In a continuation of the cross-examination, Susan admitted that, as part of the
property settlement, she had received a vehicle that was worth $27,000, free and clear of
any debt, Tr., p. 50, LL. 4-7, and jewelry valued at $11,000. Tr.,p. 50, LL. 8-13.
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Susan admitted to having a master'sdegree. Tr., p. 50, LL. 14-15. She agreed that
Marvin's income had historically fluctuated up and down. Tr., p. 50, LL. 16-20. She further
admitted, after some prodding, to a scheduled consult for plastic surgery later in
September of 2006 (the trial date was September 12, 2006) that was not medically
necessary. Tr., p. 50, L. 21 - p. 51, L. 24.
On redirect examination, Susan testified that she had sold the vehicle that she had
received in the property settlement to pay bills associated with her new home. Tr., p. 52,

L. 17 - p. 53, L. 1. She then stated that she was employed as the director of administration
for Hawley Troxell, a law firm in Boise. Tr., p. 53, LL. 2-6.
Susan's next witness was Jerry Doman, who testified to a conversation in which he
alleged that Marvin told him in colorful metaphorical terms that he wanted to bankrupt
Susan. Tr., p. 55, LL. 3-20. On cross-examination, Doman admitted that the Hawley
Troxell account that had been administered by MS Administrative Services (one of Marvin's
companies) was in the process of transferring to Smith's Administrators and that he would
benefit financially from the change. Tr., p. 60, LL. 9-24. On redirect examination, Doman
testified that Marvin had told him that, although their business dealings would continue,
their friendship was over, because of the report by Doman to Susan concerning the threat
of bankruptcy. Tr., p. 63, L. 14 - p. 64, L. 18.
Susan's last witnesswas Marvin. She opened her examination by having him testify
that, in 2005, he had completed a financial statement in which he had projected his income
for that year to be $398,000. See Exhibit 52A. He then testified that his actual income had
proven to be much less as a result of the divorce action. He explained that, pursuant to
a plan that would have brought Susan into his company, more than doubling the size of the
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company on that account, he had invested his financial resources into a building to provide
space for the anticipated expansion. When Susan filed for divorce, he still had this new
building and debt that had to be paid on that account. Hence, the reduction in his personal
income. Tr., p. 67, L. 25 - p. 68, L. 25.
Marvin then testified that his actual income for 2005 had been $273,871. Tr., p. 70,
LL. 10-19. He then asserted that his salary from MS Administrative Services in 2006 would
be $109,080. Tr., p. 70, LL. 20-22. He would have, he explained, no income from MST,
because his commission income was being paid to a company called Montoya Enterprises
for rent of the building in which his companies were located. Tr., p. 71, L. 8 - p.72, L.7
Marvin denied making the colorful remark attributed to him by Doman. Tr., p. 72,
LL. 8-18; p. 74, LL. 4-9. He explained his failure to retract the statement by stating that he
had never made it. Tr., p. 72, LL. 19-24. He testified that he was angry with Doman,
because Doman admitted sharing information obtained from Marvin with Susan, Tr., p. 73,
LL. 6-17, and because Doman was playing one party against the other for his own financial
gain. Tr., p. 74, LL. 10-14.
On cross examination, Marvin testified to 2006 financials showing a net worth of
$1,975,900. Tr., p. 74, L. 23 - p. 75, L. 7. See Exhibit 223. He explained the reduction
in net worth from that stated in the financials for 2005 by describing (1) how his assets had
ben depleted by the investment of cash into the building and from the property settlement
with Susan; (2) how his liabilities had been increased on account of the building project
(that debt, in fact, exceeded the actual value of the building); and (3) how his total income
had declined when Susan's income was no longer added to his own. Tr., p. 75, L. 8 - p
76, L. 22.
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His income was down, Marvin explained, because paying the debt on the building
was consuming the funds that he had formerly received as personal income. Tr., p. 76,

L. 7 - p. 77, L. 22. In addition, he had lost the business represented by Hawley Troxell's
account, with a net annual loss of income between $70,000 and $80,000. Tr., p. 77, L. 23

- p. 78, L. 13. He had also lost two other accounts, J.D. Lumber and Treasure Valley
Heating & Cooling, apparently because they received better quotes elsewhere. The
Treasure Valley account alone was lost income of $700 per month ($8,400 per year). Tr.,
p. 78, L. 14 - p. 79, L. 14
Marvin testified that he was borrowing money to pay his attorney fees. Tr., p. 82,

LL. 12-19. Susan, he said, had understated the assets that she took out of the house,
including furniture, exercise equipment, dishes, food and "play money". Tr., p. 82, L. 23p. 83, L. 23.
Marvin estimated that his total income in 2006 would be around $136,000. Tr., p.
83, L. 24 - p. 84, L. 2. He explained the difference between that estimate and the numbers
described by Susan as the result of lost business and Susan's use of outdated historical
data that did not reflect present reality. Tr., p. 84, LL. 3-16.
Marvin explained that he had given personal guarantees of the debts incurred by
Montoya Enterprises, MS Administrative Services and MST Insurance and that he was,
therefore, personally responsible for seeing that the debts were paid. Accordingly, all of
the debt had to be paid before he could take any income. This was the way he had run his
business for 25 years. Tr., p. 84, L. 16 - p. 85, L. 19.
After the break for lunch, Marvin projected his income for 2006 at $135,932,
including his salary from MS Administrative Services of $109,080, projected commissions
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from independent companies of $22,598, and automobile allowances totaling $4,253. Tr.,
p. 86, L. 7 - p. 87, L. 2. He asserted Susan's income to be $98,000 per year, differing from
her projection of $93,000 on account of a profit sharing distribution of $5,000. Tr., p. 87,
LL. 3-7.
Marvin then testified that his three companies (Montoya Enterprises, MS
Administrative Services and MST Insurance) were jointly responsible for paying the debts
on the building. Servicing that debt consumed all of the commission income earned'by
MST, and there was no commission income left for distribution to Marvin. The receipt of
commissions in the past, Marvin testified, was no guarantee that he would continue to do
so in the future. Tr., p. 88, LL. 4-21.
Marvin continued his testimony by explaining that he had borrowed the $66,000 that
he had paid to Susan as a part of the property settlement and that he was paying
8 114% interest per year on that debt. Tr., p. 88, L. 22 - p. 89, L. 5. He further testified that
his corporate reserve for business purposes had been reduced from $250,000 to $80,000
and that his personal reserve of $90,000 had been totally consumed. Tr., p. 89, L. 6 - p.
90. L. 4.
He then testified that Susan had, in the course of the divorce proceeding, attacked
his credibility as a father and as a person. He had been forced to fight for visitation with
his children. When the magistrate had ordered Susan to vacate the family residence (Tr.,
p. 16, LL. 8-15), Susan had retaliated by withdrawing all settlement offers on visitation. Tr.,
p. 90, L. 19 - p., 91, L. 22. He had, throughout the divorce, been willing to accept the
recommendations of professionals who had evaluated the best interests of the children.
Tr., p. 92, LL. 6-23.
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Marvin testified that he had never accused Susan of being a bad mother and
explained that he could tell from the behavior of his children that she was, in fact, a good
mother. Tr., p. 93, L. 13 - p. 94, L. 8. He was satisfied that his other concerns had been
evaluated and resolved. Tr., p. 94, LL. 9-17.
Marvin concluded his testimony by describing his net worth at $1,400,000 rather
than the $4,000,000 attributed to him by Susan. Tr., p. 94, L. 18 - p. 95, L. 21. He then
objected to paying any of Susan's costs and attorney fees incurred in the divorce. Tr., p.
95, LL. 22-25.
On redirect, Marvin testified that a financial statement from which he had testified
on direct, Exhibit 223, overstated his commission income by $8,000. Tr., p. 96, LL. 8-23.
He testified,-consistent with the financials, that he personally received no rental income
from his building, because that was paid to Montoya Enterprises. Tr., p. 97, L. 3 - p. 98,
L. 2. Marvin did not know how much rental income Montoya Enterprises actually received,
but estimated the monthly mortgage payment paid by Montoya Enterprises to be $17,000.
Tr., p. 98, L. 1 2 - p . 100, L. 9.
The loss of the Hawley Troxell and J.D. Lumber accounts, Marvin testified, cost him
about $120,000 per year. Tr., p. 100, LL. 18-23. He had not found any replacement
clients, but was continuing to market. Tr., p. 103, L. 18 - p. 104, L. I.He had paid a total
of around $44,500 of costs and attorney fees in the course of the divorce through the trial
and did not know how much he then owed. Tr., p. 101, L. 2 - p. 102, L. 9.
Susan's counsel closely questioned Marvin about the reasons for the decline in his
commission income from MST, and Marvin reiterated that, in anticipation of the new
business venture with Susan, he had invested heavily into a building to house that
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company and his other businesses. When Susan filed for divorce, he was left with all of
the debt on the building. Tr., p. 104, LL. 7-15. Servicing the debt consumed all of the
commissions paid to MST that he would otherwise have received as commission income.
Tr.,p. 104,LL.22-p. 105, L.5.
Susan's counsel then questioned Marvin about the reserves to which he had
testified previously, and Marvin reiterated that his business working capital had been
reduced from $250,000 to $80,000 and that his personal reserves had been totally
exhausted. Tr., p. 105, LL. 21 - p. 106, L. 1.
Marvin acknowledged that, when the parties had first separated, he believed that
Susan was acting in an unusual manner and that he had then been concerned about the
safety of his children. Tr., p. 107, LL. 9-23.

.

On "re-something", Tr., p. 108, L. 1, Marvin testified that, in the simplest of terms,
his income had gone down and his expenses had gone up from where they had been
historically. Tr., p. 108, L. 25 - p. 109, L. 2.
At this point, Susan rested her case, and Marvin opened his defense by calling
Fernando Veloz, the comptroller of MS Administrative Services, as his first witness. Tr.,
p. 110, LL. 10 - p. 111, L. 25. Veloz explained the structure of Marvin's companies by
noting that MS Administrative Services set up and administered health plans for employers
within the state of Idaho. MST was an insurance agency that sold insurance, working in
conjunction with MS Administrative Services. Montoya Enterprises, he said, owned the
building that housed the other two companies. Tr., p. 112, LL. 4-22. MST and MS
Administrative Services guaranteed the debt incurred by Montoya Enterprises, and Marvin

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13

guaranteed all of the liabilities incurred by all of the companies. Tr., p. 112, L. 23 - p. 113,
L. 11.

Veloz then testified to a number of financial statements:
1.

Exhibit 215, an interim statement of revenue and expense, which showed the
net income obtained by MS Administrative Services of administration of client
health plans in the partial fiscal year starting in September of 2005, through
July of 2006, to be $13,469.97. Tr., p. 114, LL. 7-23;

2.

Exhibit 216, a balance sheet showing Marvin's net equity in MS
Administrative Services to be $68,490.20, Tr., p. 117, LL. 7-25;
Exhibit 217, an interim statement of revenue and expense for December of

3.
,

.

2005, through July of 2006, showing net income to MST during that time of
$77,177.08. The statement showed commission expenses of $247,397.82,
all of which was paid to outside brokers, and none of which was paid to
Marvin. Tr., p. 118, L. 9 - p. 120, L. 22;

4.

Exhibit 218, a balance sheet showing Marvin's equity in MST lnsurance
Agency to be $78,283.02. Tr., p. 121, LL. 3-18;

5.

Exhibit 219, a profit and loss statement for Montoya Enterprises, LLC,
showing that company's income from January through July of 2006, to be
$185,275.25, obtained for the most part from MS Administrative Services
and MST Insurance, which were paying monthly rent of $20,000 with the
balance coming from other tenants. Tr., p. 121, L. 21 - p. 122, L. 23. He
further testified to monthly expenses of $18,000 for servicing the debt on the
building plus $800 per month on a debt for purchase of a lot. Tr., p. 122. L.
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24 - p. 123, L. 9. While these numbers apparently should total $18,800 per
month, Veloz testified to a combined total of $18,600 per month. Tr., p. 123,
LL. 12-23
6.

Exhibit 220, a balance sheet for Montoya Enterprises as of July 31, 2006,
showing Marvin's equity in that company to be $477,532.25. This document
showed the land and building to be the primary assets of the company. Tr.,
p. 123, L. 20 - p. 124, L. 19. The document shows paid-in capital by Marvin
of $457,276.12, which was the 20% down payment that he had to make on
the land and building to obtain a loan for the remaining 80% of the cost of
those properties. This down payment had been funded, at least in part, by
the commissions that had previously been paid to Marvin by MST lnsurance
Agency. Tr., p. 124, L. 20 - p. 125, L. 7.

After running through those exhibits, Veloz confirmed that Marvin would receive no
commission income from MST lnsurance Agency during 2006, because the commission
income received by MST was being paid through MS Administrative Services to Montoya
Enterprises to service the debt on the building. Tr., p. 126, L. 6 - p. 127, L. 7. This was
necessary, because the debt on the new building was costing $14,000 per month more
than the rent on the old office space used by Marvin's companies ($20,000 - $6,000 =
$14,000). Between them, MST lnsurance Agency and MS Administrative Services were
providing, in the form of rent, funds to Montoya Enterprises that were, in turn, used by
Montoya Enterprises to pay the debt on the building. Tr., p. 127, LL. 8 - 17.
Veloz then explained how Marvin had come to purchase the building, testifying that,
as a part of the management team for Marvin's companies, he had participated in
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discussionswith Marvin and Susan overa three-year period in which plans had been made
to expand the operation of those companies by adding a human resources consultation
firm and by making Susan the CEO of both MST lnsurance Agency and MS Administrative
Services. Veloz had projected that adding Susan to the companies would actually double
the volume of their revenues. To accommodate the anticipated growth of his companies,
Marvin bought land and built the building. Tr., p. 127, L. 5 - p. 131, L. 4.
in response to questions by the court, Veloz testified that the construction loan had
been converted to a term loan in June of 2005, when Marvin's companies took possession
of the building. When that happened, Marvin had no tenants in the lower story of the
building, which Marvin's companies were not then using. Because there were no tenants
in the lower floor to help pay the expense, MS Administrative Services and MST lnsurance

.,,

Agency had to pay the full cost of servicing the debt. Tr., p. 131, L. 22 - p. 133, L. 19.
Veloz explained that, to pay the debt on the building, Marvin had to forego
commission income that he had previously received from MST lnsurance Agency. The
income received by that company was channeled through MS Administrative Services to
Montoya Enterprises, which was the entity that actually paid the debt on the building. Tr.,
~.133,L.25-~.135,L.ll.
In response to an objection by Susan's counsel that the debt on the building was
Marvin's personal obligation, Tr., p. 135. L. 24 - p. 136, L. 5, Veloz explained that, while
Marvin had personally guaranteed the obligations of his companies, the debt was, in the
first instance, the obligation of Montoya Enterprises. To keep the corporation going, it was
necessary to service the debt. Tr., p. 136, L. 15 - p. 137, L. 13.
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Veloz then testified to the loss of two clients, a trucking company and the Hawley
Troxell law firm, that would cost MS Administrative Services and MST lnsurance Agency
about $9,000 per month in lost revenue. Tr., p. 137, L. 14 - p. 138, L. 15.
Marvin was paid, Veloz testified, a salary of $9,090 per month by MS Administrative
Services and no commissions from MST lnsurance Agency. Tr., p. 139, LL. 11-20. The
companies could not, at that time, increase Marvin's income without depriving themselves
of the means of paying the debt on the building. Increasing Marvin's salary, said Veloz,
would bankrupt the companies. Tr., p. 139, L. 21 - p. 140, L. 20; p. 143, LL. 14-24.
Moreover, Veloz explained, if Marvin took the income from his companies (thus rendering
them incapable of paying the debt), the result would be that Marvin would have to secure
individual financing and pay the debt himself. Tr.,.p. 139, L. 21 - p. 140, L. 20.
Veloz concluded his direct examination by testifying that his financial analysis
followed generally accepted accounting principles. Tr., p. 143, L. 25 - p. 144, L. 3.
On cross-examination, Veloz testified from tax returns to income to MS
Administrative Services in 2002 of $1,579,887, in 2003 of $1,598,150, in 2004 of
$1,535,718, and in 2005 (through 11 months) of $1,700,742. Projecting the 2005 income
through the last month, would result in a greater income. Tr., p. 144, L. 21 - p. 147, L. 11.
While MS Administrative Services was currently receiving the same gross revenues that
it had received historically, the company was now obligated to pay rent of $20,000 per
month that did not show up on the tax returns for earlier years. Tr., p. 147, LL. 12-20.
Marvin, Veloz said, did not personally receive rental income. Tr., p. 147, L. 21 - p.
148, L. 12. The monthly rent of $20,000 to which he had previously testified was for the
entire building. That rent had to be paid by Marvin's companies because they had no
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tenants. Tr., p. 148, LL. 16-21. The rent on the top floor alone of the building was about
$14,000 per month. Tr., p. 148, LL. 22-25.
In theory, Veloz testified, MS Administrative Services would collect $6,000 per
month of rent on the lower floor from other tenants. However, because that space had not
been leased out, MS had to subsidize Montoya Enterprises by paying that $6,000 on top
of the $14,000 for the space that it was actually using. Tr., p. 149, LL 11-18.
Veloz further testified that, regardless of what Marvin had received by way of
commission income from MST Insurance Agency in the past, the company did not have
the capacity to pay him in 2006. To assert that Marvin was receiving commission income
from MST lnsurance Agency was not true.

Marvin's companies had to cover their

operating expenses, which included the rent on the building. And, to assert that the rental
expense was tied to the commission income or expense was not true. Tr., p. 152, L. 17 p. 154, L. 2. Veloz continued by explaining that MST lnsurance Agency and MS
Administrative Services had to sell services back and forth in the form of administrative
expenses to enable both corporations to pay their bills. Tr., p. 154, L. 3 - p. 155, 1. 2.
Veloz continued his testimony on cross-examination by stating that a balance sheet
for MS Administrative Services, Exhibit 216, reflected actual costs without adjustment to
reflect fair market value of the assets or goodwill. He also pointed out that the retained
earnings of approximately $54,000 were not a cash equivalent, but instead showed the
value of investments into various assets, including a web hosting company. Tr., p. 156,
LL. 1-15. He then testified to Exhibit 217, a statement of revenue and expenses for MST
lnsurance Agency for eight months from December 1,2005, through July 31,2006 (a count
of the months shows the actual testimony that this is seven months to be a mistake),
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showing commission income of $216,716 for that period of time. Tr., p. 156, L. 16 - p. 157,

L. 6. None of that money was paid to Marvin. Tr., p. 157, LL. 7-10. It was true, said Veloz,
that MS Administrative Services received $14,000 per month from MST lnsurance Agency,
Tr., p. 158, L. 9 - p. 159, L. 6. The monies not paid to MS were the working capital reserve
to which Marvin had testified. Tr., p. 159, LL. 7-25.
Exhibit 219, a profit and loss statement for Montoya Enterprises, showed that this
company collected $185,275 from MS Administrative Services and MST lnsurance Agency
during the seven months from January through July of 2006. The expenses paid out
against that sum consisted of interest, commissions, taxes and other costs. Tr., p. 160,

LL. 1-21. When Susan's counsel attempted to describe the assets shown on Exhibit 219
as.personal to Marvin, Veloz testified repeatedly that the building was owned by Montoya

~

Enterprises. Tr., p. 162, LL. 2-16; p. 167, L. 19 - p. 168, L. 2. Marvin "owned" the building,
said Veloz, only in the sense that he guaranteed the debt on the building, along with MS
Administrative Services and MST lnsurance and that he owned the corporation that owned
the building. Tr., p. 160, L. 22 - p. 162, L. 8. The corporations, continued Veloz, actually
paid the debt on the building. If they did not do so, Marvin would be liable for the
deficiency pursuant to his personal guarantee. Tr., p. 163, LL. 6-20; p. 165, L. I 8 - p. 166,

L. 12. The equity on the asset, testified Veloz, went up as the balance on the loan went
down. Tr., p. 164, LL. 6-1 9.
Payments on the loan, testified Veloz, did not include the property taxes, which were
handled separately. Tr., p. 164, L. 24 - p. 165, L. 4. In addition, Montoya Enterprises paid
maintenance costs out of the $20,000 per month that it received as rent. Tr., p. 165, LL.

5-10. From Januarythrough July of 2006, Montoya Enterprises had generated $19,958.45
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over and above the expenses incurred in operating the building during that period of time.
Tr., p. 165. LL. 11-16. See Exhibit 219. Marvin's equity in Montoya Enterprises was about
$500,000. Tr., p. 167, LL. 4-7. See Exhibit 220.
On redirect examination, Veloz reiterated that Montoya Enterprises owned the
building and that Marvin had guaranteed the debt of that company. Tr., p. 167, L. 19 - p.
168, L. 2. Montoya Enterprises had net income of $19,958.45 over the seven month
period ending on July 31, 2006, after all expenses had been paid. Tr., p. 168, LL. 3-19.
Under questioning from the magistrate, Veloz testified that Montoya was the sole
shareholder, officer and director of MST lnsurance Agency, Inc. Tr., p. 170, LL. 10-14.
While he could theoretically take for himself the $77,171 of net income of MST, he would,
by doing so, jeopardize the financial integrity-of the companies by compromising their
ability to pay the loan on the building. Tr., p. 170, L. 15 - p. 171, L. 9. MS Administrative
Services was not, on account of its loss of clients, generating enough income to pay the
loan on an ongoing basis. Similarly, MST lnsurance Agency would soon be losing the
commissions that it had been earning on the lost accounts. Therefore, the corporations
were saving their present income in anticipation of the financial crunch resulting from a loss
of income over the next year. Tr., p. 171, LL. 10-25.
The last witness at trial was Douglas Roberts, a self-employed C.P.A. who prepared
Marvin's personal and business tax returns. Tr., p. 173, L. 14 - p. 174, L. 4. Roberts
testified that he had reviewed the financial statements prepared by Veloz and that he saw
no change of methodology in the preparation of the reports or the payment of taxes. Tr.,
p. 174, L. 10 - p. 175, L. 17. Roberts testified that Marvin's personal tax return for 2005
included the net rental income of $975 earned by Montoya Enterprises during that year.
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Tr., p. 177, L. 9 - p. 178, L. 17. The rent itself was paid by MS Administrative Services.
Tr., p. 178, LL. 18-12. Marvin's personal tax returns reflect both the income to, and
expenses incurred by, Montoya Enterprises. As expenses increase, Marvin's income
decreases in the absence of a corresponding increase in revenue. Tr., p. 179, LL. 4-20.
The methodology used in preparing Marvin's tax returns was consistent over the years and
was also consistent with IRS regulations and generally accepted accounting principles. Tr.,
p. 179, L. 21 - p. 180, L. 5.
Roberts further testified that, in the case of closely held corporations, the cash
needs of the companies dictated what the owner could take as income for himself.
Historically, from Roberts' perspective, Marvin had been careful to provide for the future
in deciding what funds he could draw from his companies. Tr., p. 180, L. 17 - p. 181, L.
8.
Placing the building in the name of Montoya Enterprises was a tax strategy on which
Marvin had decided in 2003, to allow himself a better opportunity to depreciate the building
and to take money out of the company in good years without having to pay selfemployment, social security or medicare taxes. These tax benefits, however, had no effect
on the flow of the cash through the company. Tr., p. 181, L. 9 - p. 182, L. 21.
On cross-examination, Susan elicited testimony from Roberts to the effect that
Marvin took a deduction, through his companies, of $8,740 of business vehicle expense.
Tr., p. 183, LL. 3-20. She also established that the rental income to Montoya Enterprises
would be $240,000 in 2006. Tr., p. 184, L. 18 - p. 185, L. 7. Montoya Enterprises will,
Roberts said, be able to depreciate the building over a period of 39 years. Tr., p. 185, L.
8 - p. 186, L. 15. In the course of 2005, Montoya Enterprises had reimbursed MS
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Administrative Services for $60,000 of expenses properly chargeable to the former
company. Tr., p. 187, L. I- p. 188, L. 8.
On redirect, Roberts testified that the increased rental income to Montoya
Enterprises for 2006 would be offset by increased expenses reflecting the full year of
activity that will be recorded in the tax returns. Tr., p. 188, L. 20 - p. 189, p. 9,
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

What is the role of the Memorandum Decision of the' district court in this

appeal?
2.

Was the magistrate's award of child support a manifest abuse of discretion?

3.

Did the magistrate consider all of the evidence before him?

4.

Was Susan entitled to attorney fees?

5.

Marvin claims attorney fees in this appeal pursuant to ldaho Code Section

12-121 and ldaho Appellate Rule 41. Is he entitled to them?
ARGUMENT
I. The Memorandum Decision of the
District Court is Advisory Only

When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity over
a magistrate court, the Supreme Court reviews the magistrate's decision independently of,
but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. Swanson v.
Swanson, 134 ldaho 512, 5 P.3d 973 (2000). The district court's opinion is valued for its
insight, see Sato v. Schossberger, 117 ldaho 771, 792 P.2d 336 (1990), is considered to
be instructive, Swope v. Swope, 122 ldaho 296, 834 P.2d 298 (1992), and is entitled to
serious consideration. Matter of Hanson, 121 ldaho 507, 826 P.2d 468 (1992). However,
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in the final analysis, it is not entitled to any deference. State ex rel. Industrial Commission
V.

Bible Missionary Church, 138 ldaho 847,70 P.3d 685 (2003); Matter of Baby Boy Doe,

123 ldaho 464, 849 P.2d 925 (1993). All of which is to say that the district court's opinion
is advisory only

11. The Magistrate's Award of Child Support Was
Not an Abuse of Discretion
In the course of its review, the Supreme Court considers the record before the
magistrate independently of the district court's determination. Howard v. Cornell, 134
ldaho 403, 3 P.3d 528 (2000). The Supreme Court will review the magistrate's award of
child support under an abuse of discretion standard. Browning v. Browning, 136 ldaho
691,39 P 3d 631 (2001); Aguiarv. Aguiar, 142 ldaho 331,127 P. 3d 234 (Ct. App. 2005).
The party challenging an award has the burden of establtshing that the magistrate's
calculation constituted a manifest abuse of discretion. Henderson v. Smith, 128 ldaho444,
915 P. 2d 6 (1996); Ross v. Ross, 103 ldaho 406, 648 P. 2d 1119 (1982). A magistrate
will be found to have abused his discretion in awarding child support only if he failed to give
consideration to relevant factual circumstances, or if his finding are not supported by the
evidence. See Rohrv. Rohr, 128 ldaho 137, 91 1 P. 2d 133 (1996); Margairaz v. Siegel,
137 ldaho 556, 50 P. 3d 1051 (Ct. App. 2002). The magistrate's findings are supported
by the evidence if the evidence on which he relies is substantial and competent. Peasley
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 ldaho 732, 979 P.2d 605 (1999); Ireland v. Ireland,
123 ldaho 955, 855 P.2d 40 (1993). For purposes of appellate review, findings are
competent, so long as they are supported by substantial, albeit possibly conflicting
evidence. Roe v. Roe 142 ldaho 174, 125 P.3d 530 (2005). Evidence is "substantial" if
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a reasonable trier of fact could accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed
point of fact had been proven. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352,48 P.3d

In this case, the magistrate heard historical evidence from Susan detailing what
Marvin had made in prior years. The evidence was essentially based on tax returns and
Susan's testimony only. This evidence showed that Marvin had made an average of

$338,629 per year over the three year period from 2003 to 2005. See R., at. Ex. I ; Tr., p
27, LL. 19-23. At no time did Marvin dispute this historical evidence
The magistrate, however, concluded that:
"Marvin's gross annual income for child support purposes is derived through
his salary, commissions and fringe benefits. He IS paid an annual salary of
$109,080.00. There was no evidence that Marvin is underpaid. He has received
commissions (year to date) in the amount of $17, 335.00 and projects total
commissions in 2006 to be $22,599.00. Marvin also uses a company owned vehicle
for personal use the expense to operate, in 2005, was $8,740.00. Exhibit 19,
Schedule C. The court finds that Marvin's annual gross income pursuant to the
Guidelines is $140,339.00."
If we compare these findings to the evidence offered at trial, we see that Marvin offered
testimony through thecomptrollerof MS Administrative Services, Inc., to his monthly salary
of $9,090 per month, Tr., p. 139, LL. 11-20, which translates to $109,080 per year ($9,090
x 12 = $109,080). See, Tr., p. 70, LL. 20-22. Increasing that salary, Veloz testified, would
bankrupt Marvin's companies. Tr., p. 139, L. 21 - p. 140, L. 20, p. 143, LL. 14-24. We also
see that, at one point in 2006, Marvin had calculated the commission that he had received
from unrelated companies during that year to amount to $17,335, R., at Ex. 65, Tr., p. 35,
L. 1 - p. 36, L. 18, and that he projected these commissions through the end of the year
to be $22,598. Tr., p. 86, LL. 22-23. We also see that Douglas Roberts, Marvin's personal
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accountant, testified to deductions for automobile expenses of $8,740. R., at Ex. 19,
Schedule C; Tr., p. 83, LL. 3-23.

It is obvious, therefore, that each detail of the

magistrate's findings was supported by competent and substantial evidence.
Extensivetestimony was offered through Marvin and Fernando Veloz regarding the
reasons why Marvin's current income in 2006 was less than the historical income
demonstrated by Susan's evidence. This evidence showed a combination of a decrease
in income due to lost business accounts, Tr., p. 77, L. 23 - p. 79, L. 14; p. 137, L. 14 - p.
138, L. 15, and of increased expenses for servicing the debt on a building constructed in
anticipation of an expansion of his companies by taking advantage of Susan's talents by
adding a human resource capabilities to the services provided by his companies. Tr., p.
727, L. 5 - p. 133, L. 19. Susan offered no evidence to rebut the testimony of Marvin's
witnesses. Tr., p. 190, LL. 2-3. See R., p. 43.
The magistrate was therefore presented with two undisputed views of Marvin's
income. The first (Susan's) was based on historical and outdated information, and the
second (Marvin's) was based upon Marvin's present circumstances and current financial
data explained by Marvin and his two accountants. The magistrate accepted the evidence
from Marvin and his accountants. R., p. 43. As shown above, every detail of the
magistrate's calculations of Marvin's income for child support purposes is supported by the
record. See R., p. 44. It is the job of the magistrate, not that of an appellate court, to
weigh the conflicting evidence. In re Williams, 135 ldaho 452, 19 P.3d 766 (2001); Rankin
V.

Rankin, 107 Idaho 621,691 P.2d 1236 (1984).
Intuitively, it is hard to argue with the proposition that Marvin's present obligation for

child support should be based upon his current income, without regard to what he had
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 25

earned in the past. It was clearly rational and reasonable for the magistrate to adopt that
approach in his findings and conclusions. Given that approach and the fact that each
detail of his findings was supported by competent and substantial evidence, the award of
child support in this case can hardly be characterized as a "manifest abuse of discretion".
Henderson v. Smith, supra; Ross v. Ross, supra. The award of child support at issue in
this case should therefore be affirmed on appeal.
Ill. The Magistrate Properly Considered All Factual
Circumstances Before Him
In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court correctly noted that the major
difference between the historical data presented by Susan and the current data presented
by Marvin was the result of the debt on the building constructed by Marvin, which was
consuming the commissions that had previously been distributed by MST by the
community as disposable income. R, p. 68.
The district court continued to note, also correctly, that before Marvin's companies
took possession of the new building, those companies were paying significantly less for
office space than they were now paying to service the large mortgage on the new building.
The district court also correctly noted that Marvin's companies were paying the entire cost
of the new building even though they were only using a part of the space in that structure,
because the remainder of the space had not been leased out to others. R, p. 69.
From there, the district court opined that the magistrate had failed to consider the
issue of whether it was reasonable or necessary to impose the new level of occupancy
expense upon Marvin's businesses:
"To the extent that the amount was not reasonable and necessary to the generation
of income from the business entities, then the excess amount was money that was
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going to enhance the husband's separate property interests. In connection with
child support calculations, this excess would appear to equate to "rent" from
separate property interests, and should be included in the calculation of the
husband's resources for child support purposes -even though it might appear that
the money was being applied to the mortgage debt."
R, p.70. The district court then concluded with the following paragraph:

"The money that is equivalent to the reasonable business occupancy
expense of the business being operated by the husband out of the space, and
which is being paid over to a third party in the form of interest on the mortgage, is
an adjustment to the husband's income level before the consideration of child
support. However, money being paid in excess of that reasonable to the business,
or which reduces the debt and enhances the husband's separate property interest,
should be attributable to the husband's separate property interest in the realty and
should not be applied to reduce his income for purposes of chid support
determination. In this case, there is not an analysis or finding on how much of the
money attributable tot he occupancy expense of the new building was within the
definition of reasonable and ordinary business expense and the business
operations, and how much was attributable to enhancement of the husband's
separate property interests. The amounts may be significant, and require a reversal
to reconsider the issue."

The district court's conclusions are flawed by two conceptual mistakes and the
practical evidentiary failure by Susan to introduce evidence that would allow the kind of
analysis contemplated by the district court in its decision.
The first conceptual flaw in the district court's opinion is the focus placed by the
court on the issue of whether it was reasonable to charge Marvin's businesses with the
cost of paying for the space in the new building that was intended for lease to third parties.
Implicit in the district court's analysis was the premise that, if the "extra" space was not
needed by Marvin's companies, it might be unfair to charge them with that space in
calculating Marvin's income for child support purposes.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 27

This is a flaw in the district court's reasoning, because it is Marvin's income that is
important for child support purposes, not that of any of his companies. That Marvin
chooses to do business in the form of corporations or limited liability companies, as
opposed to sole proprietorships, is irrelevant to the calculation of child support in the
absence of proof that the use of the business entities distorted the flow of income that
would otherwise come to Marvin. In this case, Susan offered no evidence to show that the
structure of Marvin's business entities distorted the flow of cash to Marvin, and Marvin
offered affirmative evidence from his accountant, Douglas Roberts, that the corporate
structure did not, in fact, make any difference in the flow of cash. Tr., p. 181, LL. 9-16.
Therefore, whether it is fair to MS or MST to bear the cost of the "extra" space is not
important to this case unless Susan proved that charging those entities with that cost
unfairly reduced Marvin's income. There is no such proof in the record.
Moreover, assume for the moment that Marvin's companies had not been charged
with that cost. As explained by Veloz, Marvin himself would then have to pay the debt. Tr.,
p. 139, L. 21 - p. 140, L. 20. Thus, that expense would still be a factor in the determination
of Marvin's income for child support purposes. The bottom line income to Marvin would
be the same in any event. Hence, the magistrate fully and accurately calculated Marvin's
income.
There is no rule of law that allows one party (Susan), to assert that, when the other
party (Marvin) has three business activities, two of which are profitable and one of which
is not, (1) child support should be calculated only on the basis of the two activities that
generate income and (2) that the losses generated by the third activity should be ignored.
Instead, child support is calculated on the basis of the net profits and losses of all
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..,.

business activities in question. A failure to consider all of the financial circumstances of
the party paying child support would itself be an abuse of discretion for failure to consider
all relevant factual circumstances. See Rohr v. Rohr, supra; Margairaz v. Siegel, supra.
The second conceptual flaw in the district court's reasoning was the emphasis that
he placed on the enhancement of Marvin's separate property interests by the money paid
by MS Administrative Services and MST Insurance Agency for the space that they did not
need for the generation of income. After the divorce, there would be no community estate
and therefore all of Marvin's income and property would be separate property interests.
In any event, the classification of his income as separate or community is irrelevant to the
calculation of child support, which turns on the amount of income rather than the type of
income.
Similarly, that Marvin uses his income to pay a debt that was his separate debt as
opposed to a community debt is likewise immaterial. After the divorce, all of Marvin's debt
was his separate obligations.

The issue is not whether the debt was separate or

community; instead, the only issue was whether it was a legitimate business debt. The
magistrate concluded that it was legitimate debt not used to conceal income. R, p. 43.
That is the only issue of relevance to the child support inquiry, and the magistrate squarely
and completely analyzed it. As indicated above, it was the magistrate's job, not that of the
district court, to evaluate the conflicting evidence. In re Williams, supra; Rankin v. Rankin,
supra.
The district court, however, continued by asserting that, to the extent that the
payments on the deed of trust reduced debt, as opposed to paying interest or insurance,
it was chargeable to Marvin as income. Even if that conclusion is accepted as true, there
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is no evidence in the record that would permit the magistrate to calculate to the extent to
which the payments on the deed of trust were for anything other than interest. That this
issue was never analyzed by the magistrate is directly attributable to the fact that Susan
never presented any proof on that issue. Appellate review is properly limited to the
evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below. Obenchain v. McAlvain
Construction, lnc., 143 ldaho 56, 137 P.3d 443 (2006). Parties are held to the theory as
to which they tried the action to the trial court, and issues not raised at trial cannot be first
presented on appeal. Cox v. Cox, 84 ldaho 513, 373 P.2d 929 (1962).
In this case, Susan tried the case on historical evidence indicating Marvin's income,
implicitly denying that any portion of the payments on the debt on the new building were
properly considered as business expenses. Marvin alleged and proved to the magistrate'ssatisfaction that these payments were legitimate business expenses. In its Memorandum
Decision, the district court attempted to fashion a compromise to the effect that some of
the payments on the debt were legitimate business expenses for child support purposes
while others were not. This theorywas not tried to the magistrate and no proof was offered
in support of that theory. The district court erred therefore in raising the issue on appeal,
because the magistrate was never given the chance to rule on that issue at trial. The
magistrate fully analyzed the evidence before him on the theories presented to him. He
cannot be faulted for failing to decide issues on which no evidence was presented to him
and which were never argued to him.
IV. Susan is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees
The magistrate's findings of fact regarding the issue of attorney fees were not
challenged on appeal. The district court, in its Memorandum Decision, articulated no basis
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for an award of attorney fees to Susan. Marvin incorporates by reference into this brief the
magistrate's analysis of the attorney fee issue. R., pp. 41 - 42. That analysis properly
recognized the issue as one requiring the magistrate to exercise his discretion. He
exercised that discretion by denying such fees in this case. Based on the evidence before
him, no one can seriously contend that his decision was an abuse of discretion, and his
decision to deny those fees should be upheld.

V. Marvin is Entitled to Attorney Fees o n Appeal Pursuant
to ldaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41
o f the ldaho Appellate Rules
Attorney fees on appeal are awardable under ldaho Code Section 22-12? and Rule
41 of the ldaho Appellate Rules if an appeal does no more than invite an appellate court
to second-guess the trial court in deciding evidentiary issues Leffunich v. Letfunich, 141
ldaho 425, 111 P.3d (2005); Johnson v. Edwards, 113 ldaho 660, 747 P.2d 69 (1987).
Despite her attempts to disguise her appeal as one raising legal issues, Susan's notice of
appeal clearly admits her intent in the statement of issues. Her first issue was whether the
magistrate erred by ignoring or misconstruingevidence, and her second issue was whether
the magistrate failed carefully to review Marvin's income and expenses. This is nothing
more than a request that the appellate courts second-guess the magistrate's findings
In this appeal, Susan has done nothing more than reiterate her claim at trial that the
payment of funds by MS Administrative Services and MST Insurance Agency to Montoya
Enterprises to pay the debt on the new building was an illegitimate attempt by Marvin to
understate his income for child support purposes. Tr., p. 28, LL. 9-24; p. 35, LL. 12-17.
The magistrate expressly rejected her argument, R, p. 43, and the district court erred, for
the reasons explained above, in accepting it, even in part.
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Susan has implicitly argued that the payments to Montoya Enterprises are part of
-

a "shell game" in which income appears and disappears without cause. Her argument
overlooks the express, undisputed testimony that the income to, and expressly paid by,
Montoya Enterprises is shown on Marvin's personal tax returns. T., p. 77, L. 9 - p. 179, L.

20. Thus, any money paid to Montoya Enterprises as opposed to Montoya himself
ultimately showed upon on Marvin's tax returns anyway. Therefore, as a practical matter,
for purposes of calculating Marvin's income after payment of all legitimate business
expenses, it made no difference that MS Administrative Services and MST Insurance
Agency paid Montoya Enterprises rather than Montoya himself. Therefore, there was no
shell game, and the magistrate's conclusions, based on the record before him, were
absolutely correct.
The appeal by Susan was simply a gambit aimed at inducing an appellate court to
second-guess the magistrate. That the district court accepted the gambit by secondguessing the magistrate as he did does not change the nature of Susan's appeal. Since
the magistrate was correct, attorney fees should be awarded on appeal pursuant to ldaho
Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41 of the ldaho Appellate Rules.

CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the magistrate's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order and the resulting judgment in all respects. It should also award Montoya the
attorney fees incurred on appeal pursuant to ldaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41 of
the ldaho Appellate Rules.
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DATED this 2oihday of May, 2008
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